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Introduction
Complicity is an ancient concept in law and ethics.
One becomes complicit in the wrongdoing of someone else
by performing actions that contribute to that
wrongdoing.1 This principle is found in the teachings of
many religious faiths,2 and it is embedded throughout the
American legal system.3 It should be no surprise then
GREGORY
MELLEMA,
COMPLICITY
AND
MORAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2016) (“When someone is complicit in the
wrongdoing of one or more principal agents, it is by virtue of
performing a contributing action.”).
2 See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE pt. II-II, Q.
62, art. 7 (addressing accomplice liability); JOHN CALVIN,
COMMENTARIES ON THE EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE GALATIANS
AND EPHESIANS 310 (William Pringle trans., 1854) (“It is not
enough that we do not, of our own accord, undertake anything
wicked. We must beware of joining or assisting those who do
wrong. In short, we must abstain from giving any consent, or
advice, or approbation, or assistance; for in all these ways we
have fellowship.”); CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH pt. 3,
¶ 1868; NIK MOHAMED AFFANDI BIN NIK YUSOFF, ISLAM &
BUSINESS 231 (Ismail Noor ed., 2002) (observing that in Islam,
“whatever is conducive towards what is prohibited is itself
forbidden”); Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is there
Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV.
59, 68 (2013) (noting that “Judaism prohibits even Jewish
consumers from facilitating a business owner’s violation of
Jewish law”).
3 See, e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1245
(2014) (acknowledging that facilitator liability “reflects a
centuries-old view of culpability: that a person may be
responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out if he
helps another to complete its commission”); U.S. D EP’T OF
JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL tit. 9, § 2474 (1998),
1
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that complicity also appears in the context of religious
exemptions from laws of general applicability, in which
the objector believes his conduct would facilitate
another’s wrongdoing. Over the past few years, highprofile religious liberty cases such as Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.4 and Zubik v. Burwell5 have
highlighted the role of complicity in Free Exercise Clause
and Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
jurisprudence.
Critics of religious exemptions have deployed a
new argument against accommodations in such cases by
suggesting that they impose “third-party harm.”6 In
particular, Professors Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel
argue that these complicity-based claims are novel and
that the claims “differ in form and in social logic” from
other free exercise claims.7 For example, a Muslim
inmate’s religious objection to shaving his beard does not

https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-2474elements-aiding-and-abetting [https://perma.cc/Z62T-W8CB]
(“The level of participation [in an unlawful venture] may be of
relatively slight moment. Also, it does not take much evidence
to satisfy the facilitation element once the defendant’s
knowledge of the unlawful purpose is established.” (citations
omitted)); Matthew Kacsmaryk, Moral Complicity at Court:
Who Decides?, PUB. DISCOURSE (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.
thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/04/16709/ [https://perma.cc/W6BJSN3X] (“In the modern era, federal, state, and territorial
governments have enacted myriad statutes, regulations, and
rules protecting the conscience rights of Americans who
abstain from practices, procedures, or products that would
violate their moral duty not to kill or cause harm.”).
4 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
5 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).
6 See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and
Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2522 (2015).
7 Id. at 2519.
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stem from any complicity with another’s alleged
wrongdoing.8 Complicity-based claims, they argue,
impose “material and dignitary harms” on third parties
that are not adequately accounted for under current
doctrine.9
Professors NeJaime and Siegel define material
harm as “deterring or obstructing access to goods and
services,”10 such as abortion or same-sex spousal
benefits.11 Dignitary harms “refer to the social meaning,
including stigma, which may result from accommodating
complicity-based objections.”12 This social meaning is
communicated when religious objectors treat “third
parties as sinners in ways that can stigmatize and
demean.”13 Complicity-based claims are particularly
stigmatizing, they argue, when refusal of services
“reflects a widely understood message about a contested
sexual norm.”14 Because of these third-party harms,
Professors NeJaime and Siegel argue that religious
accommodations should be diminished or eliminated in
many complicity cases.15
This Article argues that the third-party harm
theory is fundamentally flawed and that complicitybased religious accommodations are both a traditional
and necessary part of the American legal framework.
See id. at 2524 (citing Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015)).
Id. at 2587 (“[O]ne group of citizens should not bear the
significant costs of another’s claim to religious exercise.”).
10 Id. at 2566 (“[Material harm] can also occur as objectors
withhold information that would enable an individual to
pursue alternative providers.”).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 2522.
13 Id. at 2576.
14 Id. at 2577.
15 Id. at 2516 (“At issue is not only whether but how complicity
claims are accommodated.”).
8
9

[236]
4

COMPLICITY-BASED RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 233 (2018)

Part I examines Supreme Court precedent in the area of
free exercise and finds significant support for complicitybased accommodations. Part II reevaluates the
magnitude and legitimacy of the asserted third-party
harms, then weighs the inconveniences imposed on third
parties against the injuries to religious objectors should
accommodations be withdrawn. Part III contends that
culture war conflicts will not be resolved through the
elimination of religious accommodations in the complicity
context and proposes a subsidiarity-based alternative to
imposing coercive legal penalties on religious objectors.
I. Complicity-Based Accommodations Are Not
Novel
Professors NeJaime and Siegel acknowledge the
longstanding and “richly elaborated” theory of
complicity.16 Yet they assert that religious exemptions
based on complicity were practically unheard of prior to
Hobby Lobby and are fundamentally different from the
precedents RFRA invoked as exemplars.17 Historically,
however, the law has treated complicity-based claims
with the same regard as other claims for religious
accommodation. In fact, Hobby Lobby reaffirmed the
Supreme Court’s long-established solicitude toward
complicity-related claims.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,18 Amish parents objected to
the state’s compulsory secondary schooling requirement
and sought an exemption for Amish children who had
completed the eighth grade.19 They condemned the
“values” promoted by high schools and asserted that
Id. at 2522–23.
Id. at 2524–29.
18 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
19 Id. at 207.
16
17
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attendance entangled their families in “a ‘worldly’
influence in conflict with their beliefs.”20 By participating
in the high school system, the Amish feared their
children would be affected by the corrupting activities
and influences of third-party students, teachers, and
administrators.21 Thus, on a plausible reading of Yoder,
the Amish parents pleaded for precisely the sort of
complicity-based religious exemption that Professors
NeJaime and Siegel suggest are novel.22
Furthermore, accommodation for the Amish
carried the risk of “third-party harm.” The parents
implicitly condemned those involved with high schooling
as being engaged in objectionable conduct. Indeed, it
might be inferred they believed that those who embraced
the worldly influences of high school would suffer
damnation.23 If Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s
characterization of dignitary harm were to be accepted,
these aspersions would certainly qualify as “dignitary
harms.” Even potential material harms were at risk.
Professors NeJaime and Siegel are correct to observe that
Yoder “conceptualized the interests of the Amish children
as aligned with their parents, such that the
accommodation benefited, rather than potentially

Id. at 210–11.
Id. at 209 (“They believed that by sending their children to
high school, they would not only expose themselves to the
danger of the censure of the church community, but . . . also
endanger their own salvation and that of their children.”).
22 See Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise By Moonlight, 53 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 105, 136–37 (2016) (advancing this
interpretation of Yoder).
23 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210 (“Old Order Amish communities
today are characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation
requires life in a church community separate and apart from
the world and worldly influence.”).
20
21
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harmed, the children themselves.”24 But the
accommodation was not limited to such cases, and
indeed, the extent to which an eighth grader can make
informed decisions about such matters is questionable.
The Supreme Court granted the accommodation despite
the potential material and dignitary harms to third
parties.
Another important precedent that Professors
NeJaime and Siegel gloss over is Thomas v. Review
Board of Indiana Employment Security Division.25 In
that case, a Jehovah’s Witness who refused work in a
tank turret factory was denied unemployment
compensation.26 Although Professors NeJaime and Siegel
acknowledge that Thomas involved a complicity-based
claim for accommodation, they attempt to distinguish it
from Hobby Lobby by claiming that Thomas did “not
single out a particular group of citizens as sinning.”27
This is both inaccurate and irrelevant.28
First, Thomas did suggest that those who
manufactured the tank turrets—as well as those who
would eventually use them to kill—were engaged in
sinful conduct.29 It was precisely because Thomas
NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2526 (citing Yoder, 406
U.S. at 209).
25 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
26 Id. at 709.
27 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2526 n.45. The Supreme
Court views Thomas as directly analogous to the complicitybased claims that Professors NeJaime and Siegel criticize. See
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778
(2014) (calling the issue raised in Thomas “nearly identical” to
the one raised in Hobby Lobby).
28 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 137–38.
29 Thomas had told the hearing referee: “I really could not, you
know, conscientiously continue to work with armaments. It
would be against all of the . . . religious principles that . . . I
have come to learn. . . .” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (alteration in
24
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believed the creation of armaments to be sinful that he
quit his job. By plausible implication, one could infer that
Thomas believed those who continued to construct
armaments (or those who would ultimately use them)
were acting sinfully.
Second, it is irrelevant because complicity
analysis should be focused on the objector’s conduct and
state of mind, not the principal’s conduct and character.30
Thus, the only relevant point of inquiry is whether
Thomas’s conduct (assisting the construction of tank
turrets) violated his religious beliefs, as he understood
them.31 Thomas’s moral judgments about his fellow
original) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec.
Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (1979)).
30 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 138; see also Marc
DeGirolami, Three Thoughts on Complicity, Dignity, and
Religious Accommodation, MIRROR JUST. (July 10, 2015),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/07/threethoughts-on-complicity-dignity-and-religious-accommodation
[https://perma.cc/RJ8S-GPZ4] (“[T]he conflation of conduct and
character is a recognizable though deeply regrettable move in
many of the sorts of disputes implicating these issues.”).
31 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (“[I]t is not for us to say
that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.
Instead, our ‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’
whether the line drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”
(quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 716 (1981)); see also Eugene Volokh, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act and Complicity in Sin, WASH. POST:
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(June
30,
2014),
https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/
30/the-religious-freedom-restoration-act-and-complicity-in-sin/
[https://perma.cc/YWL5-6JM5] (observing that precisely
“[w]here the connection becomes too attenuated and morally or
religiously culpable complicity stops is a question on which
reasonable people will differ” in a discussion of Hobby Lobby
and Thomas). Thus, “when the person believes that complicity
itself is sinful, the question is not whether our secular legal
system thinks that he has drawn the right line regarding
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factory workers and the ultimate users of the tank
turrets never factor into the analysis.
Although complicity-based claims are not
themselves novel, attempting to distinguish complicity
claims from other religious accommodation claims is
novel. Presumably, under the third-party harm theory, a
Hobby Lobby-style case would be resolved differently
when (A) the objector believes the use of abortioninducing drugs is sinful than when (B) the objector
believes that insurance or drugs are forbidden as a
general matter (that is, the objection arises without the
taint of a “sin” claim). This would be a strange result—
one that asks judges to scrutinize the form of the
objector’s religious reasoning. Not only is this a task that
judges are unsuited to perform, but it encourages
religious people to formulate their objections in creative
ways to avoid complicity. Thus, if the Amish families in
Yoder formulate their objection in terms of objecting to
secular education, they will likely win. But if they phrase
their objection as avoiding complicity with a corrupt
system of education, they will likely lose. It is more
reasonable to maintain the current rule that an objector’s
moral reasoning is irrelevant for exemption purposes.32
II. Balancing Harms: Third Parties v. Religious
Objectors

complicity; it is whether he sincerely believes that the
complicity is sinful.” Id.
32 Mark L. Rienzi, Unequal Treatment of Religious Exercises
under RFRA: Explaining the Outliers in the HHS Mandate
Cases, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 10, 11 (2013) (“Properly
understood, RFRA’s ‘substantial burden’ analysis examines
whether the government is coercing a believer to abandon a
religious exercise . . . . [T]he underlying religious reasons for
the religious exercise should be entirely irrelevant.”).

[241]
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The third-party harm theory focuses on “material
and dignitary harms” that those invoking complicitybased religious objections impose on others. But the
significance of these harms and the extent to which they
should be considered in RFRA analysis is questionable.
Furthermore, the emphasis on third parties obscures or
ignores the harms that would be imposed on religious
individuals if the law no longer accommodated their
beliefs to the extent possible. To accurately evaluate the
relative social cost of permitting or denying complicitybased accommodations, both sides of the harm equation
must be considered.
This Part will first re-examine, with a critical eye,
the material and dignitary harms Professors NeJaime
and Siegel identify. Then, using their framework of thirdparty harm, I will weigh the harms imposed on religious
objectors should RFRA-style accommodations be
weakened or withdrawn in complicity cases.
A. Harms to Third Parties
Professors NeJaime and Siegel identify a series of
material and dignitary harms to third parties that they
believe set complicity-based claims apart from other
requests for religious accommodation. In this section, the
scope and magnitude of the alleged harms to third parties
will be critically re-examined.
1. Material Harms
Material harms include the inability to obtain
certain healthcare information and services, such as
abortion, emergency contraception, and assisted

[242]
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reproduction;33 difficulty finding wedding venues and
vendors for same-sex ceremonies;34 trouble obtaining
privately-provided social services, such as adoption
services;35 and denial of spousal insurance coverage or
other employment benefits to same-sex partners.36
Professors NeJaime and Siegel worry that complicitybased refusals in these areas will lead to “an
unpredictable marketplace” for same-sex couples and
others seeking sexual and reproductive services.37
Significant material harms are indeed a relevant
concern and may be a compelling state interest.
Nevertheless, there are at least three reasons why
Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s characterization of
these harms is overstated. First, material hardships that
third parties might face due to religiously motivated
refusals are already doctrinally accounted for under the
“compelling state interest” prong of RFRA analysis.38
See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2557–58, 2573.
See id. at 2562–63.
35 Id. at 2573–74.
36 See id. at 2563 n.195 and accompanying text.
37 Id. at 2574.
38 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 133 (“Compelling state
interests include third party interests within the statutory
calculus. Indeed, one might simply say that compelling state
interests just exactly are third party interests of adequate
gravity. Whose interests is the government protecting in
resisting a religious accommodation if not those of third
parties?”);
Richard
W.
Garnett,
Accommodation,
Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 39, 46 (2014) (“The justices said in Cutter that . . . ‘courts
must take adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,’ but RFRA, by
its own terms, appears to require courts to do precisely that.”
(quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005))); see
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (“It is basic
that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive
33
34
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Professors NeJaime and Siegel acknowledge this when
they observe the latent concern for third-party harms in
the Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College v. Burwell39
decisions.40 If courts considered third-party harm as a
distinct prong of analysis reserved for complicity cases,
they would double-count the harms of accommodation
and effectively give the state “another bite at the apple.”41
Under existing doctrine, only the most serious material
harms,
“endangering
paramount
[governmental]
42
interests,” are factored into RFRA’s compelling state
interest analysis. This is appropriate because although
“[m]ost exercises of constitutional rights inflict costs on
constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1944))) (explaining what constitutes a compelling
state interest). RFRA ultimately incorporated this
understanding of compelling governmental interests. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(b).
39 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
40 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (“That
consideration [of third party harm] will often inform the
analysis of the Government’s compelling interest and the
availability of a less restrictive means of advancing that
interest.”); NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2530 (“Concern
about protecting third parties from harm was a structuring
principle of the Court’s [Hobby Lobby] decision . . . . Justice
Alito’s majority opinion proceeded on the assumption that the
government has a compelling interest in ensuring women’s
‘cost-free access to . . . contraceptive methods.’” (second
alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779–80 (2014))); see
also Wheaton, 134 S. Ct. at 2807 (“Nothing in this interim order
affects the ability of the applicant’s employees and students to
obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved
contraceptives.”).
41 DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 133.
42 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1944)).
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others . . . . not everyone who feels harmed is harmed in
a legally cognizable way.”43 Depending on the
circumstance, the mere desire to obtain nonessential
goods and services may not be a significant material
harm deserving of judicial consideration.
Second, market forces are capable of solving most
cases of material hardship when religious objectors
decline to provide services.44 Though many business
owners and organizational directors hold religious
objections to participation in same-sex marriages or
providing controversial reproductive services, a greater
number hold the opposite view.45 Even those who object
may not be willing to face the legal, social, and economic
penalties of refusing service.46 In most cases, nonobjecting wedding vendors and pharmacists will be
available to provide their services, and the alleged
material harms will be nonexistent.47 Although
Professors NeJaime and Siegel worry that some
individuals will be unable to obtain emergency
contraception or HIV medication,48 extensive fact-finding
in a pharmacist objection case could not identify a single
instance of an individual who was unable to obtain
emergency contraception or HIV drugs as a result of a
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active
Minority Groups: A Response to Professors NeJaime and Siegel,
125 YALE L.J. F. 369, 379 (2016).
44 Id. at 379 (“In a market economy, refusals of service rarely
result in anyone having to do without.”).
45 See id.
46 See id. (“Even among those with serious moral objections,
few are willing to endure the risk of litigation, boycotts,
defamatory reviews, and vandalism that can follow in the wake
of refusing service on conscientious grounds.”).
47 See id. at 379–80 (noting the paucity of complicity-based
objections and the lack of empirical evidence supporting claims
of widespread refusals).
48 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2539–40, 2573.
43
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religiously motivated refusal.49 Even “in more
conservative, religious, and rural parts of the country”50
where religious objections are likely more common,
individuals will rarely find themselves without an
adequate alternative for long.51
Finally, the law has already established limiting
principles for instances when inability to obtain essential
services would inflict serious material harm. Lifethreatening medical emergencies are a prominent
example. Even though most state medical conscience
laws do not have emergency exceptions, “federal law
requires hospitals to treat or stabilize patients in
emergencies, and that federal mandate overrides all
contrary state law.”52 It is appropriate for the law to set
reasonable limitations on the circumstances in which
religious healthcare providers may refuse to perform

See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 948 (W.D.
Wash. 2012), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v.
Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 2433, 2434 (2016) (“[A]fter years of test shopping and
litigation, Defendants have not identified even one instance
where a pharmacist refused to fill or referred a patient because
of a personal, non-conscientious objection. Despite frequent
mentions of HIV during the rulemaking process, there is no
evidence that any patient has ever been denied HIV drugs due
to a conscientious or “personal” objection. . . . Finally, no Board
witness, or any other witness, was able to identify any
particular community in Washington—rural or otherwise—
that lacked timely access to emergency contraceptives or any
other time-sensitive medication.”).
50 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2574.
51 Under a Keynesian economic account, demand creates its
own supply. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Demand Creates Its Own
Supply, N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Nov. 3,
2015, 1:23 PM), https://nyti.ms/2q7v1nN.
52 Laycock, supra note 43, at 381 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395dd(b)–(c) (2012)).
49

[246]
14

COMPLICITY-BASED RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 233 (2018)

urgent, life-saving procedures.53 In the context of
abortion, which seems to be Professors NeJaime and
Siegel’s primary area of concern,54 such circumstances
may never even arise.55
2. Dignitary Harms
Next, Professors NeJaime and Siegel catalogue
dignitary harms they believe are not adequately
accounted for in the RFRA compelling state interest
analysis. Refusals to provide abortifacients or services for
a same-sex wedding, for example, communicate “a widely
understood message about a contested sexual norm.”56
And accommodating such refusals conveys a “social
meaning” that stigmatizes lawful conduct.57 These harms
often have emotional or symbolic effects.
This may not be the end of the analysis, however. It may be
preferable to permit religiously objecting hospitals to continue
to operate according to their beliefs (which inflicts some thirdparty harms) rather than force them to close down altogether
(which would inflict a greater aggregate amount of third-party
harms). See infra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
54 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2566–69.
55 Experts in obstetrics and gynecology dispute the assertion
that abortion is ever medically necessary. See COMM. ON
EXCELLENCE
IN
MATERNAL
HEALTHCARE,
DUBLIN
DECLARATION ON MATERNAL HEALTHCARE (2012), http://
www.dublindeclaration.com/ [https://perma.cc/X75K-MRLJ]
(declaring that “direct abortion”—the purposeful destruction of
the unborn child—“is not medically necessary to save the life
of a woman,” and affirming “a fundamental difference between
abortion, and necessary medical treatments that are carried
out to save the life of the mother, even if such treatment results
in the loss of life of her unborn child.”).
56 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2577.
57 Id. at 2522 (“By dignitary harms, we refer to the social
meaning, including stigma, which may result from
accommodating complicity-based objections.”).
53
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Despite anecdotal accounts that refusals leave
some customers feeling hurt or offended,58 it is
unpersuasive that permitting accommodations actually
imposes any dignitary harm. There are both practical
and theoretical difficulties with demonstrating the
reality of dignitary harms. On a practical level, offenses
are subjective and difficult to quantify. Does politely and
respectfully declining to arrange flowers for a same-sex
wedding communicate an injurious “social meaning” to
would-be customers?59 Perhaps for some, perhaps not for
others. Reasonable customers might disagree about
whether their dignity has been impugned. Would
different meanings be communicated if an objector said,
“I would be complicit in your sin” rather than “I would be
sinning myself”?60 In effect, courts would have to rely on
the testimony of the third party to determine how much
harm a refusal inflicted. It would be easy for a politically

See, e.g., id. at 2575–78.
See Brief for Appellants at 13, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.,
389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (No. 91615-2), 2015 WL 12632392
(“Mr. Ingersoll says that Mrs. Stutzman took his hand and
explained ‘she could not do the flowers because of her
relationship with Jesus Christ.’ According to him, she also said,
‘You know I love you dearly. I think you're a wonderful person
. . . . But my religion doesn't allow me to do this.’ Mrs. Stutzman
said all of this in a kind and considerate way.” (alteration in
original)); Answer at 12, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 132-00871-5 (Wash. Super. 2015), 2013 WL 10257927
(“Emotional about her convictions and her decision to decline,
Barronelle touched Robert’s hand and kindly told him that she
could not create the floral arrangements for his wedding
because of her Christian faith. . . . Barronelle and Mr. Ingersoll
hugged each other, and he left the store.”).
60 Laycock, supra note 43, at 382; see also supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
58
59
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influential interest group to define anything it does not
like as “harmful” to its members’ dignity.61
On the conceptual level, Professors NeJaime and
Siegel’s account of dignitary harm assumes that dignity
is conferred by others or by the government. According to
their theory, “the state’s authority includes the power to
confer individual dignity as a self-standing civic good.
People want to be dignified by the state, their self-worth
to be accorded official validation, and they perceive statecountenanced indignities meant for the protection of
religious freedom as real injuries demanding state
remediation.”62 But this is a mistaken understanding of
human dignity that is fundamentally at odds with the
American tradition. It “rejects the idea—captured in our
Declaration of Independence—that human dignity is
innate.”63 If dignity is innate to the human person, rather
Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1169, 1171 (2007) (reviewing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005)) (“We also have
an expansive capacity to define as harmful anything we don’t
like. A rule that no religious group could do anything the
political process defined as harmful would leave all religions at
the mercy of any interest group that could persuade some
regulatory body to act.”).
62 DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 130 (summarizing the theory
espoused by Professors NeJaime and Siegel).
63 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2631 (2015) (Thomas,
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s remarks on the intrinsic
nature of human dignity are worth including in full:
61

Human dignity has long been understood
in this country to be innate. When the Framers
proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence
that “all men are created equal” and “endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights,” they referred to a vision of mankind in
which all humans are created in the image of
God and therefore of inherent worth. That
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than conferred by the state, third parties cannot be
deprived of their dignity through legal accommodations
for religious objectors.64
Even if dignitary harms could be proven and
quantified, it is unclear that the law itself plays any role
in imposing such harms. As between the religious
vision is the foundation upon which this Nation
was built.
The corollary of that principle is that
human dignity cannot be taken away by the
government. Slaves did not lose their dignity
(any more than they lost their humanity)
because the government allowed them to be
enslaved. Those held in internment camps did
not lose their dignity because the government
confined them. And those denied governmental
benefits certainly do not lose their dignity
because the government denies them those
benefits. The government cannot bestow
dignity, and it cannot take it away.
The majority's musings are thus deeply
misguided, but at least those musings can have
no effect on the dignity of the persons the
majority demeans. Its mischaracterization of
the arguments presented by the States and
their amici can have no effect on the dignity of
those litigants. Its rejection of laws preserving
the traditional definition of marriage can have
no effect on the dignity of the people who voted
for them. Its invalidation of those laws can
have no effect on the dignity of the people who
continue to adhere to the traditional definition
of marriage. And its disdain for the
understandings of liberty and dignity upon
which this Nation was founded can have no
effect on the dignity of Americans who continue
to believe in them.
Id. at 2639.
64 See id.
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objector and the third party, the law is neutral. It takes
neither the side of the objector (proscribing the conduct
the objector views as sinful or requiring everyone
similarly situated to decline their services) nor the side
of the customer (forcing all providers to engage in
objectionable commercial transactions against their
will).65 It allows both parties the opportunity to order
their affairs as they see fit. Even if critics of religious
accommodations are correct to characterize exemptions
as a privilege of private discrimination,66 it is not obvious
that the law imposes dignitary harms, or that the
dignitary harms stemming from private discrimination
constitute a compelling state interest.67 On the other
See Sherif Girgis, Nervous Victors, Illiberal Measures: A
Response to Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel, 125 YALE L.J.
F. 399, 403 (2016) (“Legally enforcing a norm against someone
suggests coercing her to follow it. So Professors NeJaime and
Siegel are lumping traditionalist-conduct exemptions together
with legal enforcement of traditionalist views. That seems fair
only if one assumes that the default is not to accommodate
these views-so that doing so seems like a gratuitous imposition
on others. Only then does actually coercing traditionalists to
violate their consciences seem like the neutral norm.”).
66 This characterization is contested. See id. (“[C]alling
exemptions a ‘special advantage’ is tendentious. It assumes
that the default in a constitutional democracy is not to protect
conscience claims that might make a political splash. Only
then does protecting them anyway seem like favoritism.”
(footnote omitted)).
67 The only free exercise case finding a compelling state interest
in eliminating private discrimination was Bob Jones University
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). See Alex Reed,
RFRA v. ENDA: Religious Freedom and Employment
Discrimination, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 2, 38 (2016). In Bob
Jones, the state interest in promoting racial equality in
education, expressed by all three branches of the federal
government over the course of several decades, outweighed the
religious claimant’s interest in free exercise. See 461 U.S. at
604. Racial discrimination in education results in both
65
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hand, if courts adopted the dignitary harm theory, it
could become a self-fulfilling prophesy: the more that
courts “say that a policy or belief expresses disdain for a
group, the more it will take on that social meaning.”68
Even if the law imposed a dignitary harm, this
harm is non-unique and cannot be considered by courts.
The First Amendment permits speech and other forms of
expression that impose dignitary harms all the time.
What makes dignitary harm a trump card for free
exercise, but not for other First Amendment liberties,
such as free speech or freedom of the press? Because
dignitary harms “are expressive harms, based on the
‘communicative impact’ of the religious practice,”69 they
material and dignitary harms under Professors NeJaime and
Siegel’s rubric. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe the
Court’s judgment was limited in scope and not generally
applicable to issues of sexual mores with which Professors
NeJaime and Siegel are concerned. See Girgis, supra note 65,
at 411. See generally Johnny Rex Buckles, The Sexual Integrity
of Religious Schools and Tax Exemption, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 255 (2017).
68 See Girgis, supra note 65, at 404. Professor Richard Epstein
expresses a similar concern that countenancing such harmswithout-legal-injury would make “virtually all human conduct
. . . actionable.” Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for the
First Amendment, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25 (2018). He
continues:
To protect individuals against mere offensive
conduct is to invite people to merit that exalted
status by getting angrier and angrier, so that
their private resentments give strong claims of
rights against one another. Everyone can play
this game so that mutual indignation becomes
the source of great anxiety or worse.
Id.
69 Laycock, supra note 43, at 376.
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are precisely the sorts of harms that the government is
normally disallowed from considering as a legitimate
state interest.70 First Amendment jurisprudence is
replete with instances of protected speech that impose
dignitary harm on third parties: parade organizers may
exclude disfavored groups,71 proselytizers may insult
their listeners’ most cherished beliefs,72 private
expressive associations may discriminate against
members based on their sexual conduct,73 and protesters
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The
government generally has a freer hand in restricting
expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or
spoken word. It may not, however, proscribe particular conduct
because it has expressive elements.” (citations omitted));
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring
the state interest in regulating conduct be “unrelated to the
suppression of free expression”); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S.
Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (8-0 decision) (finding that the
government cannot refuse to register a trademark on the
grounds that “it expresses ideas that offend”).
71 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 578–79 (1995) (9-0 decision) (ruling that
the state’s interest in nondiscrimination could not be invoked
to require a private parade organizer to modify its expressive
conduct by including an LGBT group) (“The very idea that a
noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts
and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all
people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to
nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of
orthodox expression.”).
72 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
(affirming the right of a Jehovah’s Witness to play a
phonograph record that “attacked the [Catholic] religion and
church” and “incensed” listeners).
73 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–61 (2000);
see also Laycock, supra note 43, at 377 (observing that “Dale
had been an active and engaged scout for twelve years; the
dignitary harm of being excluded from scouting at that point
must have been vastly greater than the typical dignitary harm
70
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may express even the most vulgar and offensive slogans
at their audience’s most vulnerable moments.74 The effect
of such speech on third parties is legally irrelevant.75
That some third parties will find religiously motivated
refusals to be upsetting, offensive, or disagreeable is no
doubt true. But the resulting emotional or symbolic
injuries are simply not a matter of judicial concern.
It is inconsistent with First Amendment doctrine
and norms to assert that religious refusals that either
explicitly or implicitly “reflect[] and reiterate[] a familiar
message about contested sexual norms”76 deserve less
protection because of the viewpoint expressed by that

of being refused a one-time arms-length transaction” but that
“no Justice found a compelling interest in preventing [that]
harm”).
74 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011) (8-1 decision)
(upholding protection of slogans such as “‘God Hates the
USA/Thank God for 9/11,’ ‘America is Doomed,’ ‘Don't Pray for
the USA,’ ‘Thank God for IEDs,’ ‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers,’
‘Pope in Hell,’ ‘Priests Rape Boys,’ ‘God Hates Fags,’ ‘You're
Going to Hell,’ and ‘God Hates You’” displayed at a soldier’s
Catholic funeral).
75 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (“We have said time and again
that ‘the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of
their hearers.’” (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592
(1969))); Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (“Such speech cannot be
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”);
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 (“[T]he point of all speech protection . . .
is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes
are misguided, or even hurtful.”); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (“If
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”).
76 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2576.
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refusal.77 This impermissibly singles out religious
speakers who affirm traditional sexual moral norms for
disfavored status. The viewpoint-neutrality violation
here is even more egregious because it specially targets
religious groups because those groups are politically
engaged in culture-wide disputes about the morality of
abortion and same-sex marriage.78 Professors NeJaime
See supra note 69; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“When the
government targets not subject matter, but particular views
taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination
is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The
government must abstain from regulating speech when the
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” (citation omitted));
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (“We
have long held, for example, that nonverbal expressive activity
can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because
of the ideas it expresses . . . .”).
78 Professors NeJaime and Siegel place significant emphasis on
the fact that many religious objectors to same-sex marriage
and abortion are engaged in a broader politically active
community. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2542–45
(noting with concern that “complicity-based conscience claims
are asserted in society-wide conflicts by mobilized groups and
individuals acting in coalitions that reach across religious
denominational lines”). They assert that dignitary harms are
especially pernicious when such “a mass movement amplifies
[the refusal’s] power to demean.” Id. at 2578. In other words,
Professors NeJaime and Siegel contend, “Because these
conscientious objectors engage in a political argument, they
lose their right to conscientious objection.” See Laycock, supra
note 43, at 371 (summarizing their view); see also Girgis, supra
note 65, at 402 (“The implication is clear: Officials should
discount claims when granting them might empower believers
to push for their views, or even change laws they oppose.”).
This is preposterous. It also betrays a desperation to “lockin” the newly prevailing cultural orthodoxy on contested moral
issues. As Laycock put it: “Religious conservatives are
77
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and Siegel would likely have little objection to an
“Orthodox Jew with a wholesale grocery business [who]
refuses to stock or sell nonkosher items” in violation of
local ordinances because “he does not want to tempt or
assist any other Jew to consume the nonkosher items.”79
Even though this is a complicity-based objection, it does
not implicate a “national political battle over nonkosher
food” and Professors NeJaime and Siegel would likely not
be concerned about the “social meanings” the shopkeeper
communicates to customers who are “harmed or
inconvenienced.”80 Their argument depends (at least in
part) on the socio-political context of religious
accommodations, which is currently concentrated on
conflicts with the sexual revolution.
Religious actors are free to express tenets of their
faith that either explicitly or implicitly tell non-members
that they are sinning or will suffer damnation.81 Yet the

constitutionally entitled to argue for their views on the
regulation of sex . . . . And their exercise of that right is not a
ground for forfeiting other rights they may have, including
their right to religious exemptions. . . . Religious conservatives
do not forfeit their right to conscientious objection by making
political arguments about the laws they object to, and they do
not forfeit their right to make political arguments by invoking
their right to conscientious objection.” Laycock, supra note 43,
at 371–72.
79 Laycock, supra note 43, at 382.
80
Id. Laycock observes that this hypothetical also
demonstrates that “[c]omplicity is irrelevant to Professors
NeJaime and Siegel’s argument—unless they mean for readers
to assume that complicity claims are a lesser kind of claim, less
deserving of protection.” Id. at 382–83.
81 See Girgis, supra note 65, at 406 (“Religious freedom includes
nothing if not the rights to worship, proselytize, and convert—
forms of conduct (and speech) that can express the conviction
that outsiders are wrong. Perhaps not just wrong, but deluded
about matters of cosmic importance around which they have

[256]
24

COMPLICITY-BASED RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 233 (2018)

law does not prohibit these more straightforward sources
of dignitary injury. It would be perverse to contend that
directly saying, “You are a murderer!”82 is protected
speech, but that the speaker should be penalized for
indirectly communicating that same “social meaning”
through her refusal of services.83 The notion that
religious accommodations should be curtailed to shelter
third parties from messages about sin they do not like is
truly remarkable for its audacity.
B. Harms to Religious Objectors
There is serious reason to doubt the model of
third-party harm that Professors NeJaime and Siegel
propose. But assuming material and dignitary harms
should be considered in complicity cases, how should
courts evaluate the harms to third parties as compared
to the harms to the religious objectors themselves? To
gather a sense of the true social cost of accommodation
versus non-accommodation, the potential material and
dignitary harms imposed on religious objectors must also
be considered.
If complicity-based accommodations were to be
significantly weakened or withdrawn, it is improbable
that sincere religious objectors would continue to engage
in business that makes them complicit with what they

ordered their lives—even damnably wrong.” (footnote
omitted)).
82 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2576.
83 See id. at 2586 (“Are there ways to accommodate religious
persons without giving legal sanction to their view that other
law-abiding citizens are sinning? If the government grants an
accommodation, is the accommodation structured to block or
amplify dissemination of religious claims about the sins of
other citizens?”).
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believe to be sinful.84 In the long run, sincere religious
objectors might leave an entire industry altogether. In
the short term, religious objectors will be subjected to
catastrophic fines and penalties, as has been the case
when RFRA-style protections are unavailing. As will be
seen, the material and dignitary harms imposed on
religious objectors would be significant, both in scope and
magnitude, if RFRA accommodations were diminished or
eliminated in complicity cases.
1. Material Harms
When RFRA protections are unavailable or
denied, religious objectors commonly face grave
consequences for refusing to provide goods or services in
situations they believe would make them complicit with

Cases are plentiful in which religious objectors choose to
close their businesses rather than operate in a manner
contrary to their convictions. See infra notes 85–97 and
accompanying text; see also Epstein, supra note 68, at 36 (“The
religious organizations only ask that people, for a limited
subset of services, go down the block to another business that
is happy to serve them. The human rights proponents ask
people to give up their religious beliefs or go out of business
entirely.”).
84
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sin. Florists,85 bakers,86 wedding photographers,87 and
other artistic professionals88 who object to participating
See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash.
2017). Baronelle Stuzmann, the elderly owner of Arlene’s
Flowers in Richland, Washington, declined to provide wedding
flower arrangements for a longtime customer’s same-sex
wedding. Id. at 549. As a result, Stuzmann was found
personally liable for violating Washington’s law against
discrimination and Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 550. The
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the judgment ordering
Stuzmann to pay monetary damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
Id. at 568. In a media statement, Stuzmann’s lawyers alleged
that the judgment threatens “not only her business, but also
her family’s savings, retirement funds, and home.” Washington
Floral Artist to Ask US Supreme Court to Protect Her Freedom,
ALLIANCE
DEFENDING
FREEDOM
(Feb.
16,
2017),
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/8608 [https://perma.cc/
4ZLB-N7XP].
Although the State of Washington has a religious freedom
clause in its constitution, it has no RFRA statute. WASH.
CONST., art. I, § 11; see Hunter Schwarz, 19 States that have
‘Religious Freedom’ Laws Like Indiana’s that No One is
Boycotting, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/03/27/19-states-thathave-religious-freedom-laws-like-indianas-that-no-one-isboycotting/ [https://perma.cc/QKP6-XHQL].
86 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272
(Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied, No. 15SC738, 2016 WL 1645027
(Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290
(2017). A same-sex couple brought complaint against the
proprietor of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips, for violating
Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) when he declined
to bake a cake for their wedding ceremony. Id. at 277. Phillips
was found guilty and ordered to re-educate his staff and amend
his company policies to comply with CADA to avoid financial
penalties. Id. Masterpiece Cakeshop no longer offers wedding
cakes. See Bakery Will Stop Making Wedding Cakes After
Losing Discrimination Case, CBS DENVER (May 30, 2014),
http://denver.cbslocal.com/2014/05/30/bakery-will-stop-makingwedding-cakes-after-losing-discrimination-case/
85
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in same-sex ceremonies frequently face catastrophic fines
and even potential jail time, which threatens their
livelihoods and well-being. Owners of small bed-and-

[https://perma.cc/7423-AFXE]. Although the State of Colorado
has a religious freedom clause in its constitution, it has no
RFRA statute. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4; Schwarz, supra
note 85.
For the case of Sweet Cakes by Melissa, see infra notes 94–
98 and accompanying text.
87 See, e.g., Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428
(N.M. App. 2012). When Jonathan and Elaine Huguenin, the
owners of Elane Photography, declined to photograph Vanessa
Willock’s same-sex commitment ceremony, Willock filed a
complaint with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission.
Id. at 433. An administrative hearing found Elane
Photography guilty of violating the New Mexico Human Rights
Act and awarded $6,637.94 in attorneys’ fees to Willock. See id.
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013). In
a separate concurrence, Justice Bosson wrote that although the
Huguenins “now are compelled by law to compromise the very
religious beliefs that inspire their lives,” this sacrifice “is the
price of citizenship.” Id. at 79, 80 (Bosson, J., concurring).
88 Joanna Duka and Breanna Koski, the owners of a Phoenixbased art studio that specializes in lettering and calligraphy
for wedding invitations, have appealed the denial of a preenforcement challenge against a local ordinance that requires
them to provide services to same-sex weddings and prevents
them from communicating their faith-based reasons for
celebrating marriages between one man and one woman. See
Brief for Appellant at 1–2, Brush & Nib Studio v. City of
Phoenix, No. CV2016-052251, 2017 WL 1113222 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Mar. 8, 2017). Violation of the ordinance carries penalties of up
to $2,500 in fines and six months in jail. See PHX., ARIZ., CODE
§§ 1-5, 18-4, 18-7 (2010); see also Artists to Appeals Court: Halt
Phoenix Ordinance that Punishes Artistic Freedom with Jail
Time, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Mar. 9, 2017),
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/10037
[https://perma.cc/T9VE-J8HB].
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breakfast establishments89 and wedding venue
providers90 are often subjected to the same fate.
See, e.g., Will Brumleve, B&B Ordered to Pay Damages to
Same-Sex Couple, Stop Discriminating, FORD CTY. REC. (Mar.
29, 2016), http://www.paxtonrecord.net/news/courts-policeand-fire/2016-03-29/bb-ordered-pay-damages-same-sexcouple-stop-discriminating [https://perma.cc/T9VE-J8HB]. Jim
and Beth Walder, who own TimberCreek Bed & Breakfast in
Illinois, face large fines for refusing to rent their facility for a
same-sex wedding ceremony. Id.
In 2016, an administrative law judge ordered the Walders
to pay a total of $80,000 in “emotional distress” damages and
attorneys’ fees for making a same-sex couple feel “embarrassed
and humiliated.” Id. The judge even “ordered the B&B to offer
the Wathens access to the facility, within one year, for an event
celebrating their civil union.” Id. The judgment is being
appealed. See Will Brumleve, B&B Owner Taking Appeal to
Court, Foregoing IHRC Hearing, FORD CTY. REC. (Dec. 26,
2016),
http://www.paxtonrecord.net/news/courts-police-andfire/2016-12-26/bb-owner-taking-appeal-court-foregoing-ihrchearing [https://perma.cc/V4GL-WF6H].
90 See, e.g., Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n Of The United
Methodist Church v. Papaleo, No. CIV.A.07-3802 (JAP), 2007
WL 3349787 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007), aff’d in part and remanded
sub nom. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United
Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 F. App’x 232 (3d Cir.
2009). New Jersey’s Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association
was ordered to offer their pavilion as a wedding venue for
same-sex couples under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination. Id. at *2. Immediately thereafter, the
Association shuttered its wedding venue service. See MaryAnn
Spoto, State Sides with Lesbian Couple in Fight against Ocean
Grove Association, NJ.COM (Dec. 30, 2008), http://www.nj.com/
news/index.ssf/2008/12/judge_rules_monmouth_church_gr.html
[https://perma.cc/774T-ESGL] (noting that the parachurch
organization no longer permits wedding ceremonies on its
property).
In 2011, a lesbian couple successfully sued the Catholic
owners of the Wildflower Inn in Vermont for declining to host
their same-sex reception. See Katie Zezima, Couple Sues a
Vermont Inn for Rejecting Gay Wedding, N.Y. TIMES (July 19,
89
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Pharmacists and other health care professionals who
decline to provide birth control they believe to be
abortifacient can also be confronted with hefty
penalties.91 Both for-profit and non-profit organizations
2011), https://nyti.ms/2psU7iK. As punishment, the owners
had to pay $10,000 in civil fines to the Vermont Human Rights
Commission and put $20,000 in a charitable trust for the
lesbian couple. See Katie J.M. Baker, ‘Family Friendly’ Inn
Decides it Would Rather Stop Hosting Wedding Receptions
Altogether Than Cater to Lesbian Couple, JEZEBEL (Aug. 24,
2012), http://jezebel.com/5937548/family-friendly-inn-decidesit-would-rather-stop-hosting-weddings-altogether-than-caterto-lesbian-couple [https://perma.cc/XS8D-RZEZ]. Jim and
Mary O’Reilly no longer host wedding receptions on their
property. Id.
Robert and Cynthia Gifford, the residents of a New York
farm that also serves as a wedding venue, were fined $13,000
in a similar case in 2014. See Kirsten Andersen, Catholic
Couple Fined $13,000 for Refusing to Host Same-Sex ‘Wedding’
at Their Farm,
LIFESITENEWS (Aug. 20, 2014),
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/catholic-couple-fined-13000for-refusing-to-host-same-sex-wedding-at-their [https:// perma.cc/
F9SL-D89F]. The Giffords ultimately decided not to appeal the
ruling and have stopped using the farm for wedding
ceremonies. See Valerie Richardson, New York Farm Owners
Give up Legal Fight after Being Fined $13,000 for Refusing to
Host Gay Wedding, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/23/robertcynthia-giffords-give-legal-fight-over-same/ [https://perma.cc/
F9SL-D89F].
91 See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016). In 2007, the
Washington State Pharmacy Board passed regulations
eliminating conscience-based referrals and requiring
pharmacies to carry “morning-after pills” Plan B and ella. Id.
at 1072. Failure to comply with the regulations may result in
“discipline or other enforcement actions.” WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 246-869-010 (2007). The Storman family, which owns Ralph’s
Thriftway pharmacy, and two pharmacists objected to the
regulations because of their belief that “dispensing these drugs
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may suffer when complicity-based religious objections
are not respected.92 Perhaps most radically of all,
‘constitutes direct participation in the destruction of human
life.’” Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1073 n.3. The trial court found that
the State’s regulations were designed to target religious health
care providers. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925,
987 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v.
Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ claims and held that the
regulations did “not infringe a fundamental right.” Stormans,
794 F.3d 1064. at 1088.
Over the objection of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito and Thomas, the Supreme Court denied review.
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016). Justice
Alito observed that Washington’s regulations “are likely to
make a pharmacist unemployable if he or she objects on
religious grounds to dispensing certain prescription
medications.” Id. at 2433 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Anticipating the effect of the regulations, he
suggested that Washington “would rather have no pharmacy
than one that doesn’t toe the line on abortifacient emergency
contraceptives.” Id. at 2440. Marveling at the policy’s “hostility
toward religious objections” and the Court’s failure to review
the case, Justice Alito warned, “If this is a sign of how religious
liberty claims will be treated in the years ahead, those who
value religious freedom have cause for great concern.” Id. at
2433.
92 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2775–76 (2014). Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood, and Mardel
faced crippling fines for non-compliance with the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations about
contraceptive provision. The Court detailed the various costs of
non-compliance for Hobby Lobby:
If the Hahns and Greens and their companies
do not yield to this demand, the economic
consequences will be severe. If the companies
continue to offer group health plans that do not
cover the contraceptives at issue, they will be
taxed $100 per day for each affected individual.
For Hobby Lobby, the bill could amount to $1.3
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Professors NeJaime and Siegel suggest that religious
leaders—including priests, pastors, imams, and rabbis—

million per day or about $475 million per year;
for Conestoga, the assessment could be $90,000
per day or $33 million per year; and for Mardel,
it could be $40,000 per day or about $15 million
per year. These sums are surely substantial.
Id. at 2275–76 (citation omitted). In addition to these for-profit
examples, consider the non-profit petitioners in Zubik v.
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (per curiam). The Roman
Catholic Bishop of Pittsburgh, Priests for Life, the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Washington, East Texas Baptist
University, the Little Sisters of the Poor, Southern Nazarene
University, and Geneva College were among the organizations
that challenged the Department’s contraceptive mandate on
RFRA grounds. Id. Organizations that fail to comply with the
contraceptive mandate or obtain an exemption would be
subject to a daily fine of $100 per employee. See Sarah Torre,
Religious Liberty at the Supreme Court: Little Sisters of the
Poor Take on Obamacare Mandate, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar.
22, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/religious-liberty/report/
religious-liberty-the-supreme-court-little-sisters-the-poor-take
-obamacare [https://perma.cc/M5V7-U9ZA].
If unable to obtain an exemption, the Little Sisters of the
Poor could be fined “up to $70 million a year” for
noncompliance. Id. Catholic Charities in Pittsburgh, which has
a total operating budget of $10 million, would face between “$2
million to $4 million a year” in federal fines. See Brian Bowling,
Bishops Zubik, Persico Say They Can’t Cooperate with Health
Care Mandate, TRIBLIVE (Nov. 12, 2013), http://triblive.com/
news/adminpage/5054656-74/mandate-catholic-coverage [https://
perma.cc/8ZVB-XYG4]. California’s tiny Thomas Aquinas
College “faces fines of up to $2.8 million a year if it does not
comply with the mandate.” Kurt Jensen, Ultimate Relief from
Mandate May Lie Beyond the Courts, Say Plaintiffs, CATH.
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.catholicnews.com/
services/englishnews/2016/ultimate-relief-from-mandate-may-liebeyond-the-courts-say-plaintiffs [https://perma.cc/8ZVB-XYG4].
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should have no choice but to solemnize same-sex
ceremonies.93
Among the many penalties imposed on religious
objectors in complicity cases, one particularly draconian
instance stands out: In 2013, Aaron and Melissa Klein,
the proprietors of a small Oregon bakery called Sweet
Cakes by Melissa, declined to bake a cake for a same-sex
wedding ceremony.94 When the same-sex couple filed a
complaint, Oregon Labor Commissioner Brad Avakian
ordered the Kleins to pay $135,000 in damages to
compensate the couple for “emotional, mental and
physical suffering” related to the refusal.95 Although the
judgment is still being appealed, the massive penalty and
their vulnerability to future litigation forced the Kleins
to close their bakery in October 2016.96 “We lost our
business,” Melissa Klein said.97 “You work so hard to
build something up, and something you’ve poured your

See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2561 (“Many states
that allow same-sex couples to marry have enacted legislation
making clear that religious denominations and clergy have no
obligation to solemnize a same-sex marriage.”); cf. Complaint
at 2, Knapp v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (D.
Idaho 2016) (No. 2:14-CV-00441-REB) (describing the plight of
Christian ministers at a wedding chapel who faced up to 180
days in jail and up to $1,000 in fines for each day they refused
to perform same-sex ceremonies in violation of a local
nondiscrimination ordinance).
94 See In re Melissa Elaine Klein, Nos. 44-14, 45-14, 2015 WL
4868796, at *3 (OR BOLI July 2, 2015).
95 Id. at *23.
96 See Casey Parks, Sweet Cakes by Melissa, Bakery that
Turned Away Lesbians, Closes, OREGONIAN (Oct. 6, 2016),
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2016/10/sweet_
cakes_by_melissa_bakery.html [https://perma.cc/R7TV-543Y].
97 Id.
93
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heart into and was your passion, to lose that has been
devastating for me.”98
These heavy-handed fines and penalties
ultimately drive religious objectors out of their chosen
service, trade, or industry. In addition to the economic
harms imposed on the objectors themselves, the vacuum
created imposes material harms on third parties—
particularly foster children, victims of human trafficking,
the elderly poor, and all those who depend on religious
hospitals and healthcare providers. The withdrawal of
faith-based adoption services from states where “antidiscrimination” legislation would force organizations like
Catholic Charities to place children with adoptive samesex couples,99 for instance, has left a gaping vacuum that
harms thousands of children who languish in the foster
care system.100 A member of the U.S. Commission on
Id.
See Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Say Rules on Gay Parents
Limit Freedom of Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2011),
https://nyti.ms/2n7lwCY
(noting
Catholic
Charities’
withdrawal of adoption services from Massachusetts, Illinois,
and Washington, D.C.).
100 See Ryan Anderson & Sarah Torre, Adoption, Foster Care,
and Conscience Protection, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://www.heritage.org/marriage-and-family/report/adoptionfoster-care-and-conscience-protection [https://perma.cc/R3VUFJTD].
In the two decades before Catholic Charities of Boston
ended its adoption program, it helped place at least 720
children in permanent adoptive homes. See Archdiocese of
Boston, Catholic Charities of Boston To Discontinue Adoption
Services (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.bostoncatholic.org/
uploadedFiles/News_releases_2006_statement060310-1.pdf;
see also U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Discrimination
Against Catholic Adoption Services (2016), http://www.usccb
.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/AdoptionServices-Fact-Sheet-2016.pdf (“Catholic Charities of Boston,
which had been one of the nation’s oldest adoption agencies,
98
99
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Civil Rights observed with concern in 2016: “It is
possible, perhaps even probable, that in the near future
there will be no orthodox Christian organizations
partnering with the government to provide adoption and
foster care services in the United States.”101
Forcing religious-affiliated organizations, such as
Christian colleges, to provide health insurance plans that
include allegedly abortifacient forms of birth control led
some institutions to end health insurance coverage for
their students and employees altogether.102 If forced to

faced a very difficult choice: violate its conscience, or close its
doors.”).
In 2011, Illinois passed civil union legislation that, in
conjunction with an existing “anti-discrimination” law,
required faith-based foster care and adoption service providers
to place children with cohabiting and same-sex couples. See
Manya A. Brachear, 3 Dioceses Drop Foster Care Lawsuit, CHI.
TRIB. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/201111-15/news/ct-met-catholic-charities-foster-care-20111115_1_
civil-unions-act-catholic-charities-religious-freedom-protection.
As a result, Catholic Charities, the Evangelical Child and
Family Agency, and other faith-based adoption service
providers had to drop the adoption services of more than 2,000
children. See Anderson & Torre, supra. Even when these
children’s cases are transferred to other agencies, the
ostracism of conscientious faith-based providers burdens the
foster care system. Id.
101 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE:
RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL
LIBERTIES 61 (2016) (statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow).
102 See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 793 (7th Cir.
2015). When the Seventh Circuit refused to issue a preliminary
injunction against the contraceptive mandate, Wheaton
College chose to drop its health insurance plan altogether
rather than violate its religious principles or pay substantial
fines. See Manya Brachear Pashman, Wheaton College Ends
Coverage amid Fight Against Birth Control Mandate, CHI.
TRIB. (July 29, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
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choose between their charitable work and their religious
beliefs, the Little Sisters of the Poor would be compelled
to stop serving the 13,000 elderly poor they care for on a
regular basis.103
Likewise, victims of human trafficking are
harmed when religious groups’ anti-trafficking work is
defunded simply because those groups do not provide or
refer for abortion, contraception, or sterilization
services.104 The failure to respect faith-based providers’
breaking/ct-wheaton-college-ends-student-insurance-met20150728-story [https://perma.cc/6ZGB-EUYQ].
103 See Who Are the Little Sisters of the Poor?, THE LITTLE
SISTERS OF THE POOR, http://thelittlesistersofthepoor.com/whoare-the-little-sisters-of-the-poor-1/#who-are-the-little-sistersof-the-poor [https://perma.cc/Y5L7-XLS8] (last visited Dec. 20,
2017) (“The Little Sisters serve more than 13,000 elderly poor
in 31 countries around the world. The first home opened in
America in 1868 and now there are nearly 30 homes in the U.S.
where the elderly and dying are cared for with love and dignity
until God calls them home.”); see also Loraine Maguire,
Obamacare Attacks Religious Liberty: Little Sisters Mother
Provincial,
USA
TODAY
(Mar.
22,
2016),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/03/22/little-sisterspoor-obamacare-hhs-mandate-supreme-court-religious-libertycolumn/82076170/ [https://perma.cc/BKS3-ES3Q] (“Most of the
people who live in my residence have nowhere else to go.”).
104 See Chris Boyette, Federal Program Denies Grant to
Catholic Group to Help Sex Trafficking Victims, CNN (Dec. 6,
2011), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/06/federal-program
-denies-grant-to-catholic-group-to-help-sex-trafficking-victims/
(reporting on the defunding of the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops’ Migrant and Refugee Service). The offending
language in the USCCB’s contract read:
As we are a Catholic organization, we need
to ensure that our victims services funds are
not used to refer or fund activities that would
be contrary to our moral convictions and
religious
beliefs.
.
.
.
Specifically,
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complicity-based objections to participating in such
services ultimately harms “thousands of victims” of
human trafficking.105
Finally, if the Church Amendment and other socalled “healthcare refusal” laws—which protect the
conscience rights of health care providers to refuse to
perform or assist with abortions—are withdrawn or
diminished as Professors NeJaime and Siegel propose,106
many faith-based hospitals and physicians would exit the
healthcare industry rather than violate their beliefs. This
would represent a massive disruption of American
healthcare delivery since “one in six patients in the
United States is treated by a Catholic hospital”107 and
subcontractors could not provide or refer for
abortion services or contraceptive materials for
our clients pursuant to this contract.
KEVIN BALES & RON SOODALTER, THE SLAVE NEXT DOOR 229
(1st ed. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting the terms of the
contract). Representative Chris Smith, the author of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, remarked, “If you
are a Catholic, or other faith-based [non-governmental
organization], or a secular organization of conscience, there is
now clear proof that your grant application will not be
considered under a fair, impartial and totally transparent
process . . . .” See Boyette, supra.
105 See Boyette, supra note 104; see also Pete Winn, HHS
Withholds Grant from U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
Apparently Because Church Opposes Abortion, CATH. NEWS
SERV. (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/
article/hhs-withholds-grant-us-conference-catholic-bishopsapparently-because-church-opposes (noting that federal grants
to the USCCB’s Migrant and Relief Services had helped “more
than 2,700 victims” of human trafficking).
106 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2566.
107 Id. at 2556–57 (citing Catholic Health Care in the United
States, CATH. HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S. 1 (Jan. 2014),
https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/general-files/
cha_miniprofile_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3WL-Z4SA]).

[269]
37

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2

“[r]eligious hospitals represent nearly a fifth of the
healthcare delivery system in the United States.”108 The
extent to which Professors NeJaime and Siegel
successfully demonstrate the United States’ dependence
on faith-based healthcare is exactly the extent to which
they reveal the devastation that would result if Catholic
and other religious healthcare providers were forced to
close their doors. Millions of Americans would experience
reduced access and greater difficulty in obtaining lifesaving treatment and other medical services.109
2. Dignitary Harms
Professors NeJaime and Siegel assert that
providing exemptions for complicity-based claims “has
potential to harm those whom the claimants view as
sinning.”110 But requiring religious actors to either
violate their beliefs or close their businesses imposes
dignitary harms on those religious objectors. Unlike the
existing legal regime—which offers latitude for both
individuals seeking services and religious objectors to
live in accordance with their beliefs—weakening RFRA
protections would marginalize religious dissenters’ views
Id. at 2557 (citing Jennifer Harper, Doctors Face Religious
Conflicts at Hospitals, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/14/doctorsreport-religious-conflicts-at-hospitals [http://perma.cc/TN3TUDBE]).
109 See Catholic Health Care in the United States, CATH.
HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S. (Jan. 2017), https://www.
chausa.org/about/about/facts-statistics [https://perma.cc/GE7BUNQJ] (indicating that 649 Catholic hospitals annually admit
more than five million patients, provide 105 million outpatient
visits, and receive more than twenty million emergency room
visits).
110 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2516.
108
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with the force of law. The “social meaning” of revoking
RFRA protections for pharmacists who do not wish to
dispense abortifacients or adoption agencies which do not
wish to place children with same-sex couples is clear:
traditional views on contested sexual norms cannot be
acted upon in public life. It sends a message that
individuals with religiously motivated beliefs about
sexual morality are not welcome in certain industries.
(“No Evangelicals need apply.”) Indeed, if an individual
does act upon her religious convictions and integrates her
faith and work, the law will not shield her and may
actually impose penalties for her divergence from the
new political orthodoxy on sexual morality.
Such a legal regime imposes a far greater stigma
on religious believers than does the status quo on third
parties seeking services. This is for two reasons. First,
because the force of law would be used to actively
penalize complicity-based refusals, this legal regime
would be more coercive. Without robust RFRA
protections, the law would directly disfavor religious
individuals who hold traditional views by making their
refusals illegal. The status quo minimizes coercion by
permitting the religious actor to refuse or not, and by
allowing the third party seeking services to select any
other willing provider. Second, weakening or eliminating
accommodations for complicity-based refusals has a
pedagogical effect that stigmatizes religious actors who
hold traditional views on sexual morality. Rather than
remain neutral as between the religious objector and the
third party and allowing both sides to retain maximal
freedom to organize their affairs, such a rule would
explicitly disfavor the religious objector.111 It would treat
the dignitary interests of the third party as more worthy
111

See supra note 65.
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of legal solicitude. The “social meaning” of this favoritism
would communicate that the religious objector has sinned
by acting on her archaic moral beliefs. It would convey,
in short, that she is a bigot.112
Thus, using Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s
reasoning and definition of dignitary harm, the religious
objector is harmed at least as much (if not more) when
accommodations are denied than the third party seeking
services when accommodations are permitted.
III. Accommodations Promote Social Peace
Professors NeJaime and Siegel argue that
accommodations for complicity-based religious objections
will only prolong and intensify conflict over culture war
issues.113 They argue that the “social logic” of “crossdenominational mobilization”114 means politically active
religious traditionalists will try “to enforce traditional
morality in the law of abortion and marriage and to seek
conscience-based exemptions from laws that depart from
traditional morality.”115 Having lost the primary battle,
traditionalists now use complicity-based claims as “a way
It is commonly asserted that protections for religious
freedom shelter bigotry. See, e.g., Valerie Tarico, Right-Wing
Christianity Teaches Bigotry: The Ugly Roots of Indiana’s New
Anti-Gay Law, SALON (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.
salon.com/2015/04/04/right_wing_christianity_teaches_bigotry
_the_ugly_roots_of_indianas_new_anti_gay_law_partner/
[https://perma.cc/BU6R-H5QZ] (describing a state RFRA law
as motivated by “bigotry and homophobia”). Curtailing RFRA
protections because of the “dignitary harms” imposed on third
parties grants these accusations legal imprimatur.
113 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2553–63
(“[A]ccommodating religious exemption claims may not settle
conflict, as many contend.”).
114 Id. at 2544.
115 Id. at 2548.
112
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to continue conflict over community-wide norms in a new
form.”116 Widespread healthcare refusal laws, for
example, can be used to impede access to abortion117—
especially in areas dominated by religiously affiliated
healthcare providers.118 Conscience protections for
wedding vendors could be used “to forestall or restrict an
antidiscrimination regime that includes sexual
orientation.”119
Thus,
religious
accommodations
perpetuate culture war rivalries that Professors NeJaime
and Siegel would rather put an end to.
Even if Professors NeJaime and Siegel are right
that religious exemptions perpetuate culture war
conflicts, there is no reasonable or equitable alternative.
There is reason for hope, however, that accommodations
can promote social peace rather than intensify conflict.
A. No Reasonable Alternatives to
Accommodation Exist
No matter how much Professors NeJaime and
Siegel wish that the culture wars would disappear if
religious accommodations were curtailed, the reality is
that crushing the “other side” will not work.120 This is
Id. at 2553.
Id. at 2555.
118 Id. at 2557.
119 Id. at 2564.
120 See generally Girgis, supra note 65, at 413. Although
NeJaime and Siegel may not be motivated by political
vindictiveness, there is an undercurrent of victor’s justice
present among opponents of religious accommodations. This
attitude is best reflected by Professor Mark Tushnet, who
wrote in a revealing and now infamous blog post:
116
117

The culture wars are over; they lost, we won. .
. . For liberals, the question now is how to deal
with the losers in the culture wars. That’s
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mostly a question of tactics. My own judgment
is that taking a hard line (“You lost, live with
it”) is better than trying to accommodate the
losers . . . . Trying to be nice to the losers didn’t
work well after the Civil War, nor after Brown.
(And taking a hard line seemed to work
reasonably well in Germany and Japan after
1945.) I should note that LGBT activists in
particular seem to have settled on the hard-line
approach, while some liberal academics defend
more accommodating approaches. . . . Of course
all bets are off if Donald Trump becomes
President.
Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal
Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2016, 1:15 PM),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensivecrouch-liberal.html [https://perma.cc/DCW5-BZKU].
In a later clarification blog post, Tushnet noted that
reactions to his post claimed that he believed religious
objectors, especially in complicity cases, should be treated like
defeated Confederates and Nazis:
In the context I was writing about, for example,
“taking a hard line” means opposing on both
policy and constitutional grounds free-standing
so-called “religious liberty” laws. . . . [T]he
exemptions that might satisfy “our side” would
have to be pretty narrow [including] . . . some
sort of constraint on the exemptions’
availability in cases of claimed “complicity.” (I
don’t know whether even these would be
acceptable to activists on “our side.”) . . . [L]ike
the Japanese soldiers who were stranded on
islands in the Pacific and didn't know the war
was over, so too many people on their side
haven't yet come to terms with the fact that
they lost the culture wars.
Mark Tushnet, What Does “Taking a Hard Line” Mean?,
BALKINIZATION (May 9, 2016, 8:28 PM), https://balkin.
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because the clash runs deeper than the surface legal
conflict between free exercise and nondiscrimination: it
is a “conflict between two worldviews, both held with the
intensity generally associated with religious belief.”121
The most fundamental convictions about the nature of
God, man, and morality are at stake. A take-no-prisoners
legal approach is unlikely to change the deeply held
beliefs of religious traditionalists who, as of yet, still
constitute a sizable nationwide minority. This is
especially true while conscience protections in complicity
cases still enjoy substantial support.122 Subjecting
sympathetic religious objectors to severe penalties and

blogspot.com/2016/05/what-does-taking-hard-line-mean.html
[https://perma.cc/G84Q-F77S].
121 See Statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow, supra note 101,
at 43.
122 See PEW RES. CTR., WHERE THE PUBLIC STANDS ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY VS. NONDISCRIMINATION 3 (2016) (finding
that 30% of U.S. adults believe “[e]mployers who have a
religious objection to the use of birth control should be . . . able
to refuse to provide it in health insurance plans for their
employees,” and that 48% believe “[b]usinesses that provide
wedding services should be . . . able to refuse to provide those
services to same-sex couples if the business owner has religious
objections to homosexuality”); National Poll Shows Majority
Support Healthcare Conscience Rights, Conscience Law,
CHRISTIAN
MED.
ASS’N
(May
2011),
http://www.
freedom2care.org/docLib/200905011_Pollingsummaryhandout
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D3Z-FS3T] (finding that 77% of U.S.
adults believe healthcare professionals should not be “forced to
participate in procedures or practices to which they have moral
objections,” and that 50% support “a law under which federal
agencies and other government bodies that receive federal
funds could not discriminate against hospitals and health care
professionals who decline to participate in abortions.”).
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jail time may alienate those who would otherwise support
socially liberal policies on abortion and LGBT issues.123
Court rulings which are perceived to crush
religious dissenters may unintentionally revive the
specter of persecution (perhaps plausibly), leading
disfavored religious objectors to cling more intensely to
their beliefs.124 A hard line approach would socially
exclude and marginalize religious objectors, driving
many people of faith out of entire industries and
segments of society.125 Indeed, activists demanding the
PEW RES. CTR, supra note 122, at 5. (finding that 22% of
U.S. adults sympathized with both sides of the contraceptive
coverage issue, and that 18% of U.S. adults sympathized with
both sides of the wedding vendor issue).
124 See Bradford Richardson, Persecution of Christians is on the
Rise, Americans Say, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2016,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/5/christiansfacing-increased-persecution-america-po/
[https://perma.cc/
FKA3-CGX8] (reporting that 63% of LifeWay survey
respondents believe Christians face growing levels of
persecution); see also Right Wing Watch Staff, The Persecution
Complex: The Religious Right’s Deceptive Rallying Cry, RIGHT
WING WATCH 2 (2014), http://files.rightwingwatch.org/uploads/
persecution_report_V2.pdf
(“The
religious
persecution
narrative is nothing new . . . but it has taken off in recent years
in reaction to advances in gay rights and reproductive
freedom.”); cf. Matthew 5:11 (New King James) (“Blessed are
you when they . . . persecute you . . . for My sake.”).
125 See Statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow, supra note 101,
at 111 (“People who live in accordance with their unfashionable
religious beliefs will be unable to work in many professions.
When a baker or a photographer or a CEO is forced to
participate in activities that offend their religious beliefs, what
hope is there for a doctor, a counselor, a lawyer? Traditional
believers will have very few careers where they can both make
a living and live according to their faith. It is an unofficial form
of the legal disabilities imposed on English Catholics following
the Glorious Revolution.”); cf. Sohrab Ahmari, Sweden
Blacklists an Antiabortion Midwife, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2017,
123
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withdrawal of religious liberty protections may
themselves be engaged in a form of social hostility toward
religious groups that adhere to traditional moral
beliefs.126 If “pluralist democracy is dynamic and
fragile,”127 then maintaining it “depends on the
commitment of all politically relevant groups to its
processes. Political losers may exit the system unless
they think their interests will be accommodated or their
losses from exiting will exceed their gains.”128 This is a
distinct danger because pluralistic democracy “needs
emerging groups to commit to its processes just as much
as it needs established groups to stick to those
processes.”129
Removing accommodations and imposing stiff
penalties on religious objectors may also entrench
resistance to ascendant sexual mores and foment social
backlash. When courts aggressively implement a social
agenda, it can be interpreted that the courts engage
opponents more intensely than supporters, which could
lead to political exploitation and widespread resistance to

2:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-blacklists-anantiabortion-midwife-1491768904
[https://perma.cc/HF7QAGDQ] (describing the legal and professional ostracism of a
Swedish midwife who refuses to perform abortions).
126 See, e.g., Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch, supra note
120.
127 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How
Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of
Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1294 (2005).
128 Id. Eskridge adds, “Groups will disengage when they believe
that participation in the system is pointless due to their
permanent defeat on issues important to them . . . or when the
political process imposes fundamental burdens on them or
threatens their group identity or cohesion.” Id. at 1293.
129 Id. at 1294.
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that agenda.130 Widespread support for conscience
exceptions in complicity cases, the deeply held nature of
religious belief, and the backing of a major political party
increases the likelihood of political backlash. The
elimination of accommodations in complicity cases is
unlikely to dampen the flame of cultural contests. Not
only are these conflicts inevitable, they may even be
desirable when properly channeled.131
Since “total war” tactics are deleterious to social
cohesion, living in a sharply divided pluralistic society
requires both accommodation of religious believers and
respect for those who do not share their moralistic views.
Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s explanation that
complicity claims are unique in their “social logic” is
inadequate. Even if religious accommodations are
sometimes used “to enforce traditional norms against
those who do not share their beliefs”132 rather than to
“preserv[e] space for distinctive religious beliefs and

See Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage
Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 148–51
(2013); see also Neal Devins, I Love You, Big Brother, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 1283, 1297 (1999) (remarking on “the disastrous
backlash that occurred in the wake of Roe v. Wade”); Michael
J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). Professor Siegel,
while acknowledging destructive aspects of backlash, believes
that it nonetheless has redeeming and socially beneficial
qualities. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
373, 388–91 (2007).
131 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 101, at 214
(testimony of Marc O. DeGirolami) (“Conflict is an essential
and deep feature of our society—both unavoidable and actually
desirable, since its source is our different backgrounds,
different outlooks, and different memories.”).
132 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2591.
130
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practices,”133 this use is no more injurious to pluralism
than the proposal for which Professors NeJaime and
Siegel advocate. On balance, offering robust protections
for religious objectors is more likely to contribute to a
diverse public square.134
Rather than viewing social conflict as “a barely
contained threat to individual rights and peaceful
coexistence”135 and “evincing skepticism that shared life
is at all possible between groups locked in intractable
conflict,”136 skeptics of religious accommodations should
embrace what Professor John Inazu calls, confident
pluralism.137 This approach calls both religious believers
and skeptics alike to acknowledge that “shared existence
is not only possible, but also necessary.”138 According to
Inazu, both sides should accept a constitutional
commitment to both inclusion (that we are continually
reshaping the boundaries of our political community)139
and dissent (that even as we work to extend and
Id. at 2590.
See Ryan T. Anderson, The Defense of Marriage Isn’t Over,
PUB.
DISCOURSE
(Oct.
8,
2014),
http://www.
thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/10/13889 [http://perma.cc/UA547EH5] (“Protecting religious liberty and the rights of
conscience is the embodiment of a principled pluralism that
fosters a more diverse civil sphere. Indeed, tolerance is
essential to promoting peaceful coexistence even amid
disagreement.”).
135 Girgis, supra note 65, at 413.
136 See id. (suggesting that the “honest Rousseauian fear that
“[i]t is impossible to live at peace with those whom we regard
as damned” motivates the quest to retract religious
accommodations (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 122 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin ed.,
1968) (1762)).
137 JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM (2016).
138 Id. at 6. Professor Inazu adds that confident pluralism “does
not suppress or ignore conflict—it invites it.” Id. at 7.
139 Id. at 15–16.
133
134
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renegotiate these boundaries, we recognize the freedom
of citizens in the voluntary groups of civil society to differ
from established norms).140 Although neither of these
principles are absolute, they can help foster a modest
agreement on the individual rights of both parties.
Rather than seeking to impose their own orthodoxy, both
sides must allow room for mutual toleration.141
Confident pluralism also proposes a civic
aspiration of “living speech,” which prioritizes dialogue
and persuasion over combativeness and coercion. 142 Both
traditionalists and advocates clamoring for the
withdrawal of conscience protections would do well to
recall the Court’s advice to the Texans who proscribed
flag desecration: “The way to preserve the flag’s special
role is not to punish those who feel differently about these
matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong.”143
B. Private Ordering and Markets Mitigate
Social Conflict
Rather than using the coercive force of law to
impose a new orthodoxy on matters of sexual politics,
private ordering—guided by principles of confident
pluralism144—should be allowed to flourish. MarketId. at 16.
Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 735 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Tolerance
is a two-way street. Otherwise, the rule mandates orthodoxy,
not anti-discrimination.”).
142 INAZU, supra note 137, at 101.
143 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989).
144 Professor Inazu affirms that “[b]oycotts, strikes, and
protests against private actors are in most cases compatible
with confident pluralism,” but warns that “[w]hen we engage
in these forms of collective action, we should bear in mind the
civic aspirations of tolerance, humility, and patience.” See
supra note 137, at 115.
140
141
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based systems, which permit businesses and civil society
groups to shape social norms, are preferable to a
compulsory
legal
approach
that
eliminates
accommodations for religious objectors.145 Rather than
impose a uniform orthodoxy on society about contested
moral issues, “subsidiary institutions [should] hav[e]
spheres of private ordering that allow them to organically
. . . come to their own conclusions about those contested
matters.”146
Civic organizations—whether motivated by profit
or conviction—have already begun to develop their own
approaches to navigating conflicts between religious
liberty and issues of gender, sexuality, and reproduction.
For example, the popular room-rental service Airbnb
recently adopted a policy prohibiting all of its users from
discriminating on the basis of “sexual orientation, gender
identity, or marital status.”147 Airbnb’s policy shapes
social norms by excluding many religious traditionalists

See Adam J. MacLeod, Tempering Civil Rights Conflicts:
Common Law for the Moral Marketplace, 2016 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 643, 672 (2016) (arguing that laws impinging on religious
liberty “do not leave space for mediating conflicts between
actors within the domains of private ordering. Instead, they
turn all important questions into zero-sum contests and raise
the stakes even higher”); id. at 679–80 (observing that when
civic goods “require cooperation for their realization, legal
coercion destroys both the economic and the moral value of
those plural practices and institutions of private ordering.”).
146
Michael P. Moreland, Religious Freedom and
Discrimination, 4 J. CHRISTIAN LEGAL THOUGHT 10 (2014).
147 See Airbnb’s Nondiscrimination Policy: Our Commitment to
Inclusion and Respect, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/
help/article/1405/airbnb-s-nondiscrimination-policy--ourcommitment-to-inclusion-and-respect
[https://perma.cc/495K2DZ2] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
145

[281]
49

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2

from using its service.148 But religious traditionalists
remain at liberty to use other online room-rental services,
or to set up their own service that complies with the
dictates of conscience. Ride-hailing services such as Uber
and Lyft prohibit both drivers and passengers from
discriminating on the basis of “sexual orientation or
gender identity.”149 If for some reason a religious objector
refused to use Uber on that basis, they would remain free
to hail a taxi or launch their own ride-hailing service.
Boycotts can serve a similar purpose, so long as
they are used to “represent[] minority viewpoints against
majoritarian norms” rather than “harness[] majoritarian
power to squelch dissenting viewpoints.”150 Most
Users who decline “won’t be able to host or book using
Airbnb” and are invited to close their accounts. General
questions about the Airbnb Community Commitment, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1523/general-questionsabout-the-airbnb-community-commitment [https://perma.cc/
8AJN-JWF5] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
149 Ben Wear, Uber, Lyft Say Policies Ban Discrimination
Based on Sexual Orientation, AUSTIN AM-STATESMAN (Apr. 24,
2017), http://www.statesman.com/news/transportation/uberlyft-say-policies-ban-discrimination-based-sexualorientation/eWDh5e48iN3OXCBP1rmDEM/ [https://perma.cc/
PJK3-VFNM]; Uber Non-Discrimination Policy, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/legal/policies/non-discrimination-policy/
en/ [https://perma.cc/8JKY-X6LT] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017)
(prohibiting “discrimination on the basis of discrimination
against riders or drivers based on . . . sexual orientation, . . .
marital status, [or] gender identity”). Violators “lose access to
the Uber platform.” Id.
150 See INAZU, supra note 137, at 107; see also Ross Douthat,
The Case of Brendan Eich, N.Y. TIMES: EVALUATIONS (Apr. 8,
2014), https://nyti.ms/2mpxYAr (“[Although] a healthy
pluralism inevitably involves community norms and
community policing in some form, I suspect that an elite
culture that enforces the new norms on marriage this strictly,
and polices its own ranks this rigorously, is likely to find
148
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consumer boycotts—such as those against Target, Chickfil-A, and Hobby Lobby151—“occur in reasonably
pluralistic settings.”152 Others forms of collective action,
which resemble witch-hunting more than constructive
norm-shaping, might violate the principles of
pluralism.153
Instances of market-driven norm-shaping are
healthy insofar as they seek to nudge attitudes and
behaviors rather than coerce them. If businesses such as
Airbnb and Uber can use market power to express their
views and influence public opinion (even when doing so
imposes material or “dignitary harms” on third parties),
why not ChristianMingle when its core religious beliefs
reasons (and, indeed, is already adept at finding them) to
become increasingly anti-pluralist whenever it has the chance
to enforce those same norms on society as a whole.”).
151 See, e.g., Hayley Peterson, The Target Boycott Cost More
than Anyone Expected — and the CEO was Blindsided, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/targetceo-blindsided-by-boycott-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/T32U-XRSJ]
(describing the effects of a boycott related to Target’s
transgender restroom policy); Editorial, Progressives Against
Lunch, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/progressives-against-lunch-1462744747
[https://
perma.cc/LCC9-K52H] (describing both boycotts and counterboycotts of Chick-Fil-A); Trudy Ring, Here’s Why George Takei
Wants You to Boycott Hobby Lobby, ADVOCATE (July 2, 2014),
http://www.advocate.com/politics/2014/07/02/heres-whygeorge-takei-wants-you-boycott-hobby-lobby [https://perma.cc/
E6YG-C4M3].
152 INAZU, supra note 137, at 113.
153 See, e.g., Mary Bowerman, Indiana Pizza Shop that Won’t
Cater Gay Weddings to Close, USA TODAY (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/04/01/
indiana-family-pizzeria-wont-cater-gay-weddings/70813430/
[https://perma.cc/VA7N-3KVS] (describing how journalists
baited a small, rural pizza parlor into saying that it would not
serve same-sex weddings and how, as a result, the parlor was
overwhelmed by threatening messages and forced to close).
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are implicated?154 Why not religious business owners—
such as florists, bakers, and pharmacists? By the same
principle, civic institutions with religious commitments
should be accommodated so that they may set their own
codes of conduct when possible. Private ordering can
alleviate social tensions when its structures embody
“tolerance, humility, and patience”155 rather than
exacerbate division.
Conclusion
Complicity is a long-established concept in our
legal tradition. It neither operates differently in the
context of religious liberty claims, nor does it deserve the
law’s special disfavor. The third-party harm theory
exaggerates complicity’s perceived differences from other
religious liberty claims and invents its own novel concept
of “dignitary harms,” which has never before been
countenanced in First Amendment jurisprudence. Even
if the third-party harm theory were coherent and
cognizable, its current formulation regrettably excludes
the material and dignitary harms that would be imposed
on religious objectors should accommodations be
narrowed or revoked. In other words, “dignitary harm” is
a
two-edged
sword.
Eliminating
religious
accommodations in these situations is unlikely to foster
social peace.

See Jacob Gershman & Sara Randazzo, ChristianMingle
Opens Doors to Gay Singles Under Settlement, WALL ST. J.: L.
BLOG (June 30, 2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/06/30/
christianmingle-com-opens-doors-to-gay-singles-undersettlement/ (reporting that ChristianMingle has agreed to
permit same-sex matches after settling a discrimination
lawsuit).
155 INAZU, supra note 137, at 83.
154
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Thus, instead of using the coercive force of law to
censor expressive conduct and to lock-in the gains of the
sexual revolution, market-based systems and private
ordering should be allowed to take their course. If we are
to have a truly diverse and pluralistic public square,
there must be consideration for both religious actors and
third parties. That includes robust accommodations for
religious objectors in complicity cases. Perhaps most
importantly, it includes a posture of humility and mutual
respect.
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